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THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY IN 1993:
THE YEAR OF THE MERGER
Erin M. Reilly
"Vision is trivial. Doing it is the hard part."
- James L. Barksdale'
Experiencing unprecedented change in an era of
convergence, the telecommunications industry will
long remember 1993 as the year of the merger.2 The
mergers of today permit the efficient and economical
exchange of technology in an era where the liquida-
tion of billions of corporate dollars to acquire entire
companies is no longer practical. The abundance of
recent mergers can be distinguished from the merg-
ers and acquisitions of the past decade in two re-
spects: 1) the majority of these mergers are "strategic
alliances, usually within the acquirer's own industry
and are aimed at creating an even stronger resulting
entity;"8 and 2) these mergers involve market shares
rather than cash as "the currency of choice in most
deals." 4 These deals are being forged out of a desire
to control information, data and services through do-
minion over both the medium and the means of
distribution.'
Mergers such as that of AT&T-McCaw, if suc-
cessful, promise to incite the Regional Bell Operat-
ing Companies ("RBOCs")' into unbridled competi-
tion among themselves, as they attempt to challenge
AT&T's dominance over the long-distance market,
' Anthony Ramirez, Deal May Quicken Pace of Wireless
Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at D5. Mr. Barksdale is
the President and Chief Operating Officer of McCaw, and will
be the head of AT&T's wireless operations. John T. Mulqueen,
Users Skeptical of Mega-Merger Payoff, COMM. WEEK, Aug.
23, 1993, at 146.
2 It has been described as a "feeding frenzy." Mary E.
Thyfault, It's Your Call - A Second Communications Revolu-
tion Will Offer Business True Freedom of Choice, INFO. WEEK,
Jan. 3, 1994, at 13, (quoting John Loewenberg, CIO of Aetna
Information at Aetna Life & Casualty Co. in Hartford, Conn.)
' Gregory Zuckerman, At Long Last, M&A Activity Turns
Positively Feverish, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Oct. 18,
1993, at 21.
4 Id. at 21, 22.
Jack Egan, Merger Mania Entertains Hollywood, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1993, at 48.
' The current seven RBOCs are the result of the consolida-
join forces with cable television carriers, invest in
cellular, and establish wireless consortiums. At the
same time, AT&T has its eye on the local loop
where competition is intensifying and where the
RBOCs currently control ninety-eight percent of all
local service.'
The pending union of AT&T and McCaw, a
$12.6 billion stock swap announced August 18,
1993,9 promises to create a nationwide wireless net-
work that will result in formidable new competition
to existing cellular operators. AT&T's proposed
merger, the fifth largest in United States history, 0
establishes a combination of wireless and long dis-
tance that is bound to shake up the $7.8 billion cel-
lular industry.1
The merger comes at a time when the other large
long-haul players, namely MCI and Sprint, have
also decided to invest in cellular and wireless tech-
nology. The technological investments of the three
dominant interexchange carriers ("IXCs") could re-
sult in significantly lower prices and new service op-
tions for the consumer. The telecommunications
companies are competing for what they see as the
ultimate goal-"universal follow-me roaming"-a
wireless phone service that can operate at any time
and in any location.'2
tion of AT&T's twenty-two Bell Operating Companies (BOCs)
following divestiture in 1984. United States v. American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
afl'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).
1 The local loop extends from the central office of the local
exchange to the end user and back to the exchange. In re Policy
and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7474, para. 128 (1993).
B Thyfault, supra note 2, at 12.
* Eileen Messmer & Bob Wallace, AT&T Grabs All of
McCaw, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 23, 1993, at 31.
10 Id.
1 Josh Hyatt, AT&T Heads Home Again; For Consumers,
the Merger Could Offer a Wide Array of New Competition,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 1993, at 33.
12 Id.
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Bell Atlantic's proposed $26 billion stock swap
with TCI, a merger of the giant regional phone com-
pany and the nation's largest cable television con-
glomerate, came to a halt on February 23, 1993,
when the two companies were unable to agree on a
price tag for the deal. The two companies announced
that the Federal Communication Commission's
("FCC" or "Commission") recent decision to slash
cable prices by seven percent significantly reduced
the value of TCI's cable properties.1"
The proposed merger was an even larger bid for
digital-era dominance than that of AT&T-Mc-
Caw,14 and had been labeled the boldest gamble yet
on the coming convergence of computers, telecommu-
nications and the media." In its desire to bring
about a revolution in home entertainment and infor-
mation through digital technology, and to become a
programming powerhouse in the world of interactive
media, Bell Atlantic had hoped, and yet may succeed
with another partner, to set the standard for the cre-
ation of a modern communications company, the
likes of which the industry has never seen. 6
This onslaught of mergers can be attributed to
several different factors. The wave of new technol-
ogy, ranging from cellular and wireless to digital and
fiber optics, has spurred on this era of merger hyste-
ria, compelling communications companies to pool
both technological and economic resources in order
to compete more effectively. However, the reason
provided for many of these mergers-to advance
technological achievements and to speed up the arri-
val of the "information superhighway" -may sim-
ply be an excuse for controlling the technology, be-
cause by doing so, mega-companies are more likely
'" Sandra Sugawara & Paul Farhi, Bell Atlantic, TCI Call
Off Merger, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1993, at Al.
14 Linda Grant, A Surge in Shares Drives the Deals, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1993, at 49.
6 Mark Landler & Bart Ziegler, Bell Ringer! How Bell At-
lantic and TCI Hooked Up-And What It Means for the Infor-
mation Age, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 25, 1993, at 33-34.
16 Id. at 36.
17 Sugawara & Farhi, supra note 13, at Al. Bell Atlantic
Chairman and CEO Raymond Smith stated that the proposed
merger with TCI would speed up the arrival of the information
superhighway. Id.
18 See generally Louis Galambos, Theodore M. Vail and the
Role of Innovation in the Modern Bell, Bus. His. REV., Mar.
22, 1992. Vertical integration usually occurs when a company
acquires another company that is either a customer or supplier,
an act which may substantially foreclose competition. ERNEST
GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS, IN A NUTSHELL
SERIES 342-43 (3d ed. 1986). Because the newly merged entity
no longer may have to engage in business with any other compa-
nies, competition is altered among the acquiring company's sup-
to force the smaller competitors out of the game.
Significantly, these mergers may reflect a desire on
the part of many communications companies to re-
treat to the vertical integration practices that are
characteristic of the pre-divestiture Bell System.18 In
their attempts to achieve sheer economic omnipo-
tence over the rest of the industry, merging compa-
nies have the potential for substantial private advan-
tage at the expense of the public interest. If
permitted, these mergers may succeed in stifling
competition in the marketplace, rather than enhanc-
ing it-the very danger that Judge Harold Greene
sought to protect through the 1982 Modified Final
Judgment ("MFJ"). 9
This Comment seeks to explore the significance of
these mergers as the communications industry heads
towards an era of convergence and technological
revolution. Part I explains the technological innova-
tions that have served as a catalyst for the mergers.
It then discusses the implications of both telephone
company ("telco") and cable mergers on the MFJ,
and the possibility of a reversal or revision of the
MFJ as AT&T attempts to regain its footing within
the local loop and the RBOCs seek access to the in-
terexchange marketplace.
Part II examines the role that the AT&T-McCaw
merger is playing in the migration towards wireless
communications and the impact this merger will
have on the cellular market and the bypassing of the
local loop. Part II also analyzes the effect that cable
and telco mergers will have on the union of the two
industries, altering forever the landscape of the local'
exchange. It then discusses the abundance of other
industry mergers of noteworthy significance, includ-
pliers, customers and competitors. Id.
However, because some vertical mergers may be the result of
internal expansion, a practice generally unchallengeable under
antitrust law, only those vertical mergers whose anticompetitive
practices outweigh possible advantages may be legally prohib-
ited. Id. at 344.
1" United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982), afPd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The MFJ modified the
1956 Consent Decree (United States v. Western Electric Co.,
Civil Action No. 17-49, C.A. 82-0192 (D.C. Cir. 1956)) of a
1948 antitrust lawsuit against AT&T, which had limited the
company to providing regulated common carrier communications
services only, and precluded Western Electric from manufactur-
ing equipment other than that used by the Bell System. In es-
sence, the terms of the MFJ restricted AT&T to providing in-
terexchange (long-distance) services. The RBOCs were
permitted to provide exchange telecommunications and exchange
access (local service) but were forbidden to enter the inter-
exchange market. The MFJ effectively announced the era of
divestiture.
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ing MCI-British Telecom ("BT"), Sprint-Centel,
and Paramount-Viacom, and how their visions com-
pare to that of AT&T. Part III examines the future
impact of such mergers, including the antitrust and
regulatory implications thereof, and the market reac-
tion from the perspective of both competition and the
consumer.
This Comment concludes that the impact of these
mergers will depend largely on their ability to
achieve results that will satisfy the general public,
the FCC's universal service standard, and the public
interest standards, in terms of vigorous competition,
technologically sound service and increased savings
to consumers. Of equal significance is the position
that Congress, the Department of Justice ("DOJ"),
and the court systems ultimately will adopt with re-
gard to the antitrust implications of the mergers.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW
A. Wireless Technology
The development of wireless technology has pro-
vided a wide variety of options for business users in
the communications industry. Wireless communica-
tions is made possible with the use of tiny devices
called microwave chips,20 and the majority of wire-
less commodities utilize digital technology, a means
of encoding information in a communications signal
through the use of bits, or binary digits.2 Because
20 Aaron Zitner, Cutting the Cords: Area Firms Scramble to
Become Players in New Wireless World, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
24, 1993, at 35.
21 These "bits" are expressed in the binary language of com-
puters as a series of "Os" and "ls." Philip Moeller, The Age of
Convergence, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 26.
The bits respond to the presence or absence of electrical energy
inside of the computer, and are assembled into larger groups of
information interpreted by the computer. Id. These larger bits
are known as "bytes," the size of which are ever-increasing, due
to advances in computer technology. Id.
22 Mark Fleischmann, The Trouble With Multimedia,
WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1994, at T10.
2 Moeller, supra note 21. Switching is a term used to de-
scribe the activity performed by an exchange whereby a signal or
telephone call is routed from one terminal located in a central
building in each community and connected to another terminal.
Frank G. McKay, New Wave Coming in Data-Voice Switching;
Telecommunications Switching, TELEPHONE ENGINEER &
MGMT., Oct. 15, 1984, at 71.
2' Moeller, supra note 21.
25 Joanne Ball Artis, Cellular Phones Expand Reach, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1993, at 29.
26 Edmund Andrews, The AT&T Deal's Big Losers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at Dl. One such favored digital system is
digital information is numerically simplistic, this
method of transmission is able to provide more effi-
cient and flexible networking than analog transmis-
sion," and thus, is replacing the current switching
system of the telephone industry.2" The question is
not whether there will be a big future in wireless,
but rather which companies will play a part."'
1. Cellular
In the decade since its advent on the market, the
cellular telephone has become more than a high-tech
business tool for those negotiating business in traf-
fic;23 the cellular telephone has become both a pro-
fessional and personal lifeline for many owners.
Traditionally, cellular telephone service has relied
upon the analog system, a method of modulating ra-
dio signals, which produces inferior sound and has
far less capacity than the digital systems preferred by
some telecommunications companies. 6
Industry reports confirm that approximately fifty
percent of all cellular users are making personal
calls, although the majority of users still operate
their cellular phones primarily for business pur-
poses. " In 1992, more than eleven million Ameri-
cans owned cellular phones, a growth of more than
forty-six percent from 1991.2" Operating costs have
decreased significantly, with average monthly bills
down from $300 to $100 over the past two years.29
The cost of the cellular hardware ranges from $20 to
$2,000.80 The disadvantages of the service are the in-
the time division multiple access system ("TDMA") favored by
such companies as McCaw and Southwestern Bell and formerly
by Ameritech. Charles F. Mason, Ameritech Drops TDMA,
Says Technology is Inferior to Analog; Time Division Multiple
Access, TELEPHONY, July 26, 1993, at 8. The TDMA system
divides the specific time period on a particular frequency into
different sections, with different phone conversations assigned to
each section. Revolutionizing Communications; Either a Conve-
nience or a Necessity, Cellular Technology May Be in 3.5 Mil-
lion Hands This Year, HFD-THE WEEKLY HOME FURNISH-
INGS NEWSPAPER, June 8, 1992, at A4. An alternate digital
system, known as the code division multiple access digital system
("CDMA"), has been less thoroughly tested than TDMA and
designates a special and distinct code at the opening of each con-
versation. Id. The CDMA system would thus compel all signals
other than the assigned conversation to bypass the subscriber's
antenna. Id. CDMA technology currently is supported by Bell
Atlantic, Pacific Telesis and U.S. West. See Mason, supra, at 8.
27 Artis, supra note 25, at 29.
25 Id.
29 Id. Perhaps equally as important, the availability of cellu-
lar phones has altered highway travel forever, with users now
able to report accidents, traffic jams, and drunk drivers to fellow
motorists, highway authorities and family members. Id.
80 Id.
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trusive nature of the cellular telephone and the fact
that the cellular telephone owner must pay whether
they make or receive a call."1
2. Personal Communications Services
Personal communications services ("PCS") have
been broadly defined as a family of mobile and port-
able radio services that will enable individuals to
communicate from any place at any time.32 While
cellular and enhanced specialized mobile radio ser-
vice providers have heretofore utilized analog trans-
mission and currently are developing microcell appli-
cations, PCS uses the more efficient digital signals
and will rely upon the development of microcell
technology in the 2 GHz microwave band.33
PCS phones use different radio frequencies than
cellular and more transmitters to minimize disrup-
tions, regardless of the user's location.3 ' Competition
to existing cellular, paging and private radio services
may result in lower consumer prices as well as in-
31 Id. This is a situation that cellular carriers such as U.S.
West have already begun to change. Briefs, NETWORK WORLD,
Aug. 23, 1993, at 31. U.S. West has recently launched a pro-
gram entitled "Caller Pays" in Boise, Idaho, whereby cellular
customers will pay only for those calls made from their cellular
phones. Id. Cellular callers will be informed that a toll will be
assessed to them for any call made to a subscriber's cellular
phone. Id.
82 Andrew C. Barrett & Byron F. Marchant, Emerging
Technologies And Personal Communications Services: Regula-
tory Issues, I CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 4 (1993). PCS encom-
passes a range of services, from pocket telephones and advanced
paging and data communications to handheld computers, and
has been compared to a new kind of mobile phone, smaller,
lighter and cheaper to operate than the cellular phone. Laurent
Belsie & Mark Trumbull, PCS Reaches Out For Cellular User,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 14, 1993, at 8. The light-
weight mobility of PCS will enable providers of the service to
offer a more portable, person-to-person communications service.
Barrett & Marchant, supra, at 4.
2' Id. Microcells are tinier and greater in number than those
cells used in cellular telephones. Id. There are more cell sites,
thus, microcells permit frequencies to be used more often, result-
ing in an increased system capacity. Id. Microcell technology
makes the network more expensive to build, yet results in a
clearer signal and a lighter, more compact phone because the
signal does not have as far to travel. Id.
"4 Anthony Ramirez, A Wireless Telephone Venture Excites
Experts, Not Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at D4. PCS
will be able to provide a variety of information services, includ-
ing voice mail, video, and data services, which are expected to
rival cellular telephones.
25 Barrett & Marchant, supra note 32, at 5.
3e Action in Docket Case-New Personal Communications
Services Established (GN Dkt. No. 90-314), FCC News, Sept.
23, 1993, at 1.
creased efficiency of the mobile services.3 5 The FCC
has predicted that PCS will "usher in an era of mo-
bile telecommunications technology that will permit
access to an array of voice, data, and video communi-
cations services, regardless of where a subscriber
may be located."3 6
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
("1993 Budget Act") adopted by Congress on Au-
gust 10, 1993, authorized the Commission to utilize
competitive bidding procedures to award PCS li-
censes.3 7 Most significantly, in its First Report and
Order, the Commission permitted cellular licensees 8
to compete for PCS licenses outside of their existing
cellular service areas, or in any area where the cellu-
lar licensee serves less than ten percent of the popu-
lation of the PCS service area."9 Many different
types of companies, including AT&T, McCaw" and
MCI, are vying for the PCS licenses that the FCC
will auction off in 1995.41
Although the experts tend to disagree on whether
PCS will ultimately replace cellular,42 there is little
doubt that, priced correctly and transcending its cur-
17 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). On September 23, 1993, the FCC
held hearings in order to establish rules and policies regarding
the award of PCS licenses and set the licensing term at ten
years, with provisions for renewal expectancy similar to those
already in place for cellular. Action in Docket Case, supra note
36, para. 3.
" The FCC defines cellular licensees as "entities which
have an ownership interest of 20 percent or more in a cellular
system." Action in Docket Case, supra note 36, para. 3.
89 Id. Cellular licensees are also permitted to compete for
one of the 10 MHz PCS channels in their existing service area,
while local exchange carriers are given the same opportunity to
bid for PCS as any other applicant, except insofar as they have
cellular holdings or licenses. Id.
40 AT&T PCS Vice President Lewis Chakrin has stated
that AT&T will join McCaw in filing for PCS spectrum outside
of McCaw's existing cellular markets. See generally McCaw/
AT&T Merger: Its Implications for PCS, PCS NEWS, Sept. 2,
1993.
"' Since the Fall of 1992, MCI has been testing PCS and
has "signed agreements in principle" with approximately 150
companies in order to create a nationwide PCS consortium. Id.
Such companies include LECs, cable television companies (in-
cluding Viacom, Jones Intercable and Times Mirror Cable),
paging companies and utilities. David Baron, Rules for PCS Al-
location Announced; FCC Announces Regulations for Radio
Spectrum Distribution for Personal Communications Services,
DIGITAL MEDIA, Oct. 21, 1993, at 21. The goal of the consor-
tium is to compete against AT&T-McCaw and the RBOCs in
the burgeoning PCS industry. Id.
42 The Arthur D. Little Company estimates that within the
decade half of all homes will possess at least one wireless device,
and cellular phone subscribers will increase by 24 million sub-
scribers, up from the current figure of 11 million today. Id.
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rent definition as a consumer service or personal
telephone number, PCS could effectively compete
with cellular service for business users. 4  Cellular
may be more expensive than other wireless options
currently in place, such as radio networks, but it re-
mains more flexible and better suited to handle large
data transfers and interactive data communications
than its radio counterparts."
3. Direct Broadcast Satellites
A direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") system is a
radio communications system in which high-powered
geostationary satellites are able to retransmit signals
from earth directly to small "dishes" or earth sta-
tions that are mounted on subscribers homes or
buildings.' 5 Since the first system began operating in
1983,46 DBS has become commercially feasible due
to the existence of relatively inexpensive receiving
equipment, and thus, may be a viable alternative to
cable." Many practitioners in the cable industry an-
ticipate that DBS ultimately will compete head-to-
head with cable, by cutting into the current number
of cable subscribers, and by making it increasingly
difficult for cable to compete with broadcasters for
advertising. 4'
DBS's initial subscribers will be the non-cable and
the satellite-based non-Television Receive Only
households that are willing to install a satellite re-
ceiver for DBS service, either because a cable opera-
tor does not service their location, or because they
are dissatisfied with the cable or the Television Re-
ceive Only programming offerings.' 9 DBS competi-
tion is significant because it may reduce the ability of
many cable companies to compete effectively with
the telcos, and thus, preclude the necessity of the
problematic cable rate regulation that is currently a
topic of great concern among cable companies, regu-
'a Belsie & Trumbull, supra note 32, at 8.
Lynne Gregg, Mixed Signals From Wireless Communica-
tions, NETWORK WORLD, June 15, 1993, at 51.
"" Lawrence P. Blaskopf, Defining the Relevant Product
Market of the New Video Technologies, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 7
(1985). The laser disc quality of DBS is specifically designed for
home reception. Harry A. Jessell, DBS; To Be or Not To Be,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 15, 1993, at 22.
46 T. Barton Carter et al., THE FIRST AMENDMENT & THE
FIFTH ESTATE 509 (3d ed. 1993).
47 Id. at 509-11.
,8 Regional Rollout Planned; DBS Leaders Predict Satellite
Service Will Have Big Impact on Cable, COMM. DAILY, Mar.
25, 1994, at 5.
" Michael Elasmar, DBS! But Is It Viable?, SATELLITE
COMM., July 1993, at 3A. Despite the fact that DBS should be
lators and consumers. At a minimum, the existence
of DBS may compel cable companies to act less like
a utility and to devote more effort to programming,5"
and, ultimately, to merge with companies such as
telcos in order to effectively compete.
B. The Current Trend Toward Wireless
The emergence of cellular and radio-based net-
works and other wireless communication options
such as PCS will have a profound effect on the land-
scape of the business environment. The primary rea-
son for such an impact is the elimination of the need
for the telephone, computer or facsimile user to be
bound to his or her desk by copper or fiber cables. 1
Telecommunications has begun the transition
from analog to digital technology, improving the
speed and accuracy of transmitting data through the
network in a process similar to that of "switching
from writing longhand to shorthand, packing more
punch in a given space."5 The significance of merg-
ers such as AT&T-McCaw lies in the blurring of
the regulatory borders between cable and telephone
and wireless,58 and in encouraging other mergers or
joint ventures to spring up between the local carriers
and cable television or cellular operators."' Such ac-
tivity will inevitably increase competition and ulti-
mately enhance the benefit to the consumer with an
increase in the availability of service options.
C. Cable
1. Fiber Optics
Fiber optics is a term for the transmission of digi-
tal information such as voice and data, whereby light
waves are modulated and transmitted over fibers of
able to entrench itself in underserved rural locations, some
broadcasters believe that DBS will not entice current cable sub-
scribers unless such customers are largely dissatisfied, and that
the 30% of households not currently subscribing to cable will be
unwilling to spend hundreds of dollars for a satellite service.
Jessell, supra note 45, at 22.
50 From Utility to Programmer; After 'Tough' Retransmis-
sion Deals, Fox V.P. Says Cable Must Change, COMM. DAILY,
Oct. 8, 1993, at 4.
"l Gregg, supra note 44, at 51.
52 Dan Dorfman, Pro Pushes Telecommunications, USA
TODAY, Aug. 20, 1993, at 2B.
53 Id.
" Matthew Katz, Multimedia: the Future of Information
Delivery to Homes and Businesses, LASERDISK PROF., Nov.
1993, at 14. See also Baron, supra note 41, at 21.
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fine glass5" surrounded by a metal sheath." This
high-tech fiber is becoming the cable of choice be-
cause it has the greatest capacity of any known
transmission medium 57 and is less susceptible to elec-
trical interference. Fiber optics differs from coaxial
cable, most often used to connect television sets, be-
cause fiber optic cables do not conduct electricity,
whereas coaxial cable transmit electrical impulses.58
As cable companies position themselves to enter
the wireless and data-communications market, they
will rely upon a combination of fiber-optic, coaxial
and wireless transmission facilities. 9 Despite the fact
that most cable operators find themselves trailing the
RBOCs in their ability to provide traditional com-
munications services, cable companies possess a tech-
nical advantage with high-bandwidth connections
into residences, and are better positioned to enter the
wireless market of PCS. 0
The mid 1990s may prove to be a watershed for
the cable industry as, for the first time, competition
from the marketplace compels true pricing; the in-
dustry will continue to thrive and make money, but
not with the same pervasiveness as in the past. Most
cable companies cannot afford to invest in new infra-
structure, especially in the wake of the recent cable
6 Moeller, supra note 21, at 24.
6 Sandra Sugawara, A Power Play for the Information
Highway? Some Utilities Plan to Use Their Fiber-Optic Sys-
tems to Rival Cable and Phone Firms' Projects, WASH. POST,
Dec. 29, 1993, at Dl.
" Fleischmann, supra note 22, at T10. One MCI specimen
containing 40 fiber optic strands has the capacity to carry nearly
1.3 million phone conversations or 1,920 television channels.
Robert Samuelson, Lost on the Information Superhighway,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1993, at A25. In addition to having a
faster transmission rate, fiber optic cables have approximately
eight thousand times the capacity of copper cables. Elisabeth
Geake, Lusting for Information? Possibility of Telecomputing in
the Future, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 16, 1993, at 44.
" Sandra Sugawara, A Power Play for the Information
Highway?, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1993, at Dl. Invented by
scientists at Corning, Inc., in 1970, fiber optic technology is fun-
damental to the success of cable and telecommunications mergers
because its huge bandwidth capacity facilitates delivery of virtu-
ally any audio, video or computer service to homes and busi-
nesses. Samuelson, supra note 57, at A25. Such resplendent tech-
nology makes fiber optics the true foundation for the information
superhighway. Id. However, some engineers do not necessarily
see fiber optics as the Holy Grail, because they believe that the
real power in the local infrastructure lies in the switching and in
the digital compression. Telcos also understand that the wiring
of subscribers with fiber optic cable is both expensive and often
impractical, because laying fiber optic cable can cost as much as
$3,000 per subscriber, whereas laying a new cable line costs ap-
proximately $500 per subscriber. S. Ronald Foster, CATV Sys-
tems Are Evolving to Support a Wide Range of Services; Deliv-
ering Voice and Other Service Over Cable Television Systems,
rate gouging, thus, one solution is for the cable in-
dustry to get into telephony. The quickest and most
efficient way for the cable companies to gain access
to this valuable infrastructure, and thus ensure their
own viability as effective competitors in this era of
convergence, is by merging with a telco.61
Cable operators, such as TCI and Time Warner
Entertainment, have articulated a vision in which
high-capacity fiber optic cables will not only deliver
games and programming, but will act as two-way
paths for financial and database communications
from the home. 2 As the technology that fuels and
makes possible the mergers between cable and telco,
the potential for fiber optics, once unleashed, cannot
be underestimated.
2. Cross-ownership - The Chesapeake and Poto-
mac Decision"3
On August 24, 1993, Bell Atlantic acquired the
right to provide video programming in part of its
Virginia service area, by successfully striking down
the 1984 statutory telephone/cable television cross-
ownership ban. 4
In essence, the C&P Telephone decision makes it
TELECOM., Jan. 1994, at 95.
69 Eric Smalley, Cable Firms Plot Data Course; Obstacles
Include Nationwide Coverage, PC WEEK, Dec. 13, 1993, at 45.
The current practice of cable company networks is to run fiber
optics from the cable central offices out to the neighborhoods
where coaxial distribution networks and drop lines connect to
customers. Id. Cable television companies intend to upgrade the
coaxial cables, ultimately replacing them with fiber optics. Id.
60 Id. Cox Cable, an early developer of PCS, is one of three
companies awarded preference by the FCC in bidding for por-
tions of the radio spectrum being made available for PCS.
61 In so doing, cable companies will add the plain old tele-
phone service ("POTs") component of wireless technology, to a
fiber or coaxial broadband cable system. John Williamson, UK.
Cable Telephony; A Window on the Future, TELEPHONY, Oct.
5, 1992, at S6.
" George Mannes, Two-Way TV, VIDEO MAG., Jan. 1994,
at 46.
" Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v.
United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), appeal
pending.
64 Cross-ownership of content and distribution has tradition-
ally been a legally volatile mixture. Michael Schrage, The Baby
Bells Go Hollywood, and We're Talking Deals, Baby, WASH.
POST, Aug. 26, 1993, at B3. In 1984, when the cable industry
was in its infancy, the FCC sought to protect the fledgling in-
dustry through the 1984 Cable Act, which restricted cable-telco
cross-ownership in order to prohibit telcos from supplying pro-
gramming within their respective regions. Andrew C. Barrett,
Shifting Foundations: The Regulation of Telecommunications in
an Era of Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 39, 54 (1993). Ten
years later, the cable industry no longer requires such extensive
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possible for telephone companies across the country
to seek full rights of free speech and to compete on
the same playing field as other mediums of mass
communications, including cable operators,65 in pro-
viding programming to consumers. Additionally, the
C&P Telephone decision enabled local exchange
carriers ("LECs") to vie for a position as full-
fledged players, in the switched broadband
marketplace. 66
The ruling by U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis in-
creases the effectiveness and the immediate impact of
proposed mergers, and perhaps more importantly,
could result in providing the consumer with superior
choice, service and price options in the wake of in-
creased competition.6 7 It remains to be seen, how-
ever, whether this decision ultimately will foster
healthy competition and reduced rates for consumers,
or whether it will encourage monopolistic behavior
on the part of merging cable and telephone compa-
nies. The full impact of the C&P Telephone decision
may never be determined, however, if it is over-
turned on appeal.
D. The Modified Final Judgment
The 1982 Modified Final Judgment ("MFJ")
was an attempt to curb perceived antitrust practices
of AT&T,6" then "the largest corporation in the
world by any reckoning," 69 in violation of the Sher-
protection, a fact that has prompted the FCC to reconsider its
cable-telco cross-ownership policy. Id.
" David A. Irwin & Michael G. Jones, Bell Atlantic Court
Case Wins 'MCI Execunet Award, WASH. TELECOM NEWS,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 3; The C&P court held that the cross-owner-
ship ban violated Bell Atlantic's First Amendment right to free
expression. 830 F. Supp. 909.
66 Irwin & Jones, supra note 65, at 3. The significance of
the C&P decision is extraordinary, as it further blurs the lines
between common carriage and mass media, and sets the stage for
a possible future recognition of unobstructed First Amendment
rights for broadcasters as well as all other video programmers.
Ultimately, the government may be hard-pressed to continue to
justify the "must carry" provisions of the Cable Act of 1992,
with the cable operators bound to comply with a complex system
of rate regulations, while watching from the sidelines as telcos
build state-of-the-art video distribution systems. Id. at 4. The
C&P decision was not about a mere transformation of the local
telephone company into the local cable company. Rather, this
decision affects the ownership of content, and the battle is over
which company will own the software and programming trans-
mitted to the consumer's television set or personal computer.
Schrage, supra note 64, at B3.
67 Cindy Skrzycki, Ruling Opens Cable TV Rivalry, WASH.
POST, Aug. 25, 1993, at A6.
" Specifically, the complaint alleged that AT&T had mo-
nopolized a broad variety of telecommunications services and
man Anti-Trust Act of 1914.70 Judge Greene was
fully aware that such an undertaking had enormous
implications, including the potential for private gain
at the expense of the public interest.7 ' To this end,
he proposed a modification of AT&T's settlement
with the DOJ that met his standard of an effective
antitrust remedy; a remedy that "effectively opens
the relevant markets to competition and prevents the
recurrence of anticompetitive activity, all without im-
posing undue and unnecessary burdens upon other
aspects of the public interest ....
The MFJ relegated AT&T to the field of inter-
exchange carriage, with the former BO~s now
divested of their parent company and broken up into
the seven RBOCs and the twenty-two Bell Operat-
ing Companies ("BOCs").73 The new AT&T was
free to enter into any business but electronic publish-
ing, and while the BOGs would handle all in-
traLATA ("Local Access and Transport Area")
traffic and services, AT&T would be responsible for
supplying all interLATA traffic in competition with
other IXCs, such as MCI and what is now called
Sprint.'
The MFJ also severely restricted the line of busi-
ness activities of the BOCs. 5 The BOCs could sup-
ply or market but could no longer manufacture tele-
communications equipment or customer premises
equipment ("CPE").7 6 The BOCs were permitted to
provide exchange telecommunications services and
equipment in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. United
States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp.
131, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1982), af'd sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
69 Id. at 151-152.
70 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
7' 552 F. Supp. at 152.
72 Id. at 153.
73 Id. at 141-42, 200-01.
74 Id. at 170-72, 186.
76 Since 1982, Judge Harold Greene has proven to be quite
lenient on the RBOCs, and already has lifted one of the line of
business restrictions regarding information services, although the
content of these services is still restricted. David A. Irwin, Court
Decisions: AT&T/Dept. of Justice Settlement, TELECOMM.
REG. MONITOR, Nov. 1988, at 2-15, 2-22.2-22.3. Additionally,
in the first triennial review of the MFJ, Judge Greene found
that the RBOCs should be permitted to enter into any non-tele-
communications field without the prior permission of the court.
Id.
71 United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 1982), afl'd sub nom. Ma-
ryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). RBOCs are cur-
rently forbidden to sell or manufacture any telecommunications
equipment, a restriction that may change if H.R. 3626 passes.
See infra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
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exchange access, but were forbidden to offer in-
terLATA or interexchange telecommunications
services.77
Since the imposition of the MFJ, the BOCs have
campaigned vigorously to eliminate these restric-
tions-a campaign that is in full force today. 78 Di-
vestiture permitted AT&T to enter into the field of
data processing and computers," to maintain a high
profit long-distance business,"' and to get rid of the
bottleneck local exchange. Through its proposed
merger with McCaw, AT&T is poised on the brink
of violating the MFJ restriction that limits AT&T
to providing services in the interexchange market.8 1
The merger would give AT&T a firm grasp on vir-
tually every important new technology, and would
ensure AT&T a key role in shaping the future of
wireless, PCS and mobile computing.
Despite the DOJ opinion that AT&T cannot ac-
quire McCaw assets without first obtaining a waiver
of the MFJ decree,82 AT&T's current position is
that it is unnecessary to seek a reversal of the MFJ
provisions restricting the company to provision of in-
terexchange services."
in considering the current antitrust concerns of
AT&T's merger with McCaw, it is significant to
7 552 F. Supp. at 227, 229. This meant that the LECs had
to turn all signals over to the IXCs and remain confined to in-
traLATA service areas. The BOCs were dominated by equal ac-
cess requirements, compelling them to provide exchange and in-
formation access on an unbundled, tariffed basis, equal in type,
quality and price, to all interexchange carriers and information
service providers. Id.
7" The possibility that AT&T will find a position for itself
in the local loop has caused the RBOCs to declare that in the
interest of fairness and competition, the RBOCs should be per-
mitted to enter the long-distance market. In 1993, five of the
RBOCs-BellSouth, Bell Atlantic, Pacific Telesis, NYNEX and
Southwestern Bell collectively petitioned the FCC to adopt rules
facilitating their reentry into the interexchange business. Victor
J. Toth, Ending the RBOC Long Distance Quarantine, Bus.
COMM. REV., Oct. 1993, at 51. Ameritech filed separately and
the seventh RBOC, U.S. West, is apparently waiting to see how
the others fare before taking any action of its own. Id. Bell At-
lantic already has filed a petition with Judge Greene seeking a
waiver of the current restrictions on interLATA traffic. David
A. Irwin, Bell Atlantic/TCI Merger: How Government Will
Get Involved, WASH. TELECOM NEWS, Oct. 25, 1993, at 1-2.
This is rapidly becoming an era that will unleash the potential
of wireless bypass, perhaps the single greatest threat to the Bells,
and thus the RBOCs would like to see an unbundling of services
to enable them to achieve diversification and to compete effec-
tively. Steve A. Sazegari, The Shape of Competition in the Local
Loop, Bus. COMM. REV., Mar. 1992, at 47.
"' Stanley Welland, Life After Divestiture, INFO. WEEK,
Jan. 6, 1992, at 48.
so See generally Jeff Kaplan, The Uncertain Future of Cen-
trex, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 14, 1984.
note that the 1982 settlement was a modification of
the 1956 Consent Decree of a 1949 antitrust case
against AT&T84 that limited AT&T to providing
regulated common carrier communications services.8"
The legal analysis of AT&T's settlement with the
DOJ in 1956 is relatively obscure because the court
did little more than "rubber stamp" the settlement, a
deed which prompted the enactment of the Tunney
Act.86 The 1956 Consent Decree, however, included
neither the divestiture of Western Electric nor any
other structural relief originally requested by the
government.8 7 In 1982, Judge Greene specifically
stated that the settlement history between AT&T
and the DOJ did "not foster a sense of confidence
that the assessment of the settlement and its implica-
tions may be left entirely up to AT&T and the De-
partment of Justice."88 For this reason, it appears
likely that Judge Greene will assume an active role
in determining the success of the AT&T-McCaw
merger.
It is the opinion of some that the best solution may
be to unlock both the interexchange and the local
loop, thus precluding the necessity of enforcing the
provisions of the MFJ while encouraging competi-
81 552 F. Supp. at 226-27.
82 Memorandum in Opposition to AT&T's Motion for
Waiver of Section 1(D), United States v. Western Electric Co.,
Inc. (D.D.C. filed Jan. 5, 1994) (No. 82-0192 HHG).
81 AT&T Says McCaw Merger Will Go Through Despite
MFJ Problem, COMMON CARRIER WEEK, Jan. 10, 1994, at 4.
AT&T responded to the filing by stating its belief that a waiver
of the MFJ is not required: "Even if a waiver were required,
we would expect there would be no significant problem in get-
ting it quickly approved .... We remain confident that there is
no impediment to closing the AT&T-McCaw merger by [mid-
year]." Id.
84 See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
8' United States v. Western Electric, Civil Action No. 17-49,
C.A. 82-0192 (D.D.C. 1956) ("1956 Consent Decree"). The
complaint alleged that the defendants had monopolized and con-
spired to restrain trade in the manufacture, distribution, sale and
installation of telephones, telephone apparatus, equipment,
materials and supplies, in violation of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the
Sherman Act. 552 F. Supp. at 135-36.
80 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(d) (1988). Through the Tunney Act,
Congress sought to ensure that the DOJ's use of consent decrees
would promote the goals of antitrust laws and enhance public
confidence in the fair enforcement of these antitrust laws. 552 F.
Supp. at 148. Congress did so by ordering disclosure by the
DOJ of both the rationale and the terms of the proposed consent
decree in order to reduce secrecy, and by requiring explicit judi-
cial determination that each decree was in the public interest, in
order to avoid judicial "rubber stamping" of settlements. Id. at
148-149.
87 552 F. Supp. at 137-138.
88 Id. at 153.
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tion from all players on both sides of the exchange. 89
Proponents of opening up the local exchange believe
that it is in the best interest of the free marketplace
and theorize that such action ultimately should result
in extending the best possible service in the form of
price breaks to the consumer.90 On the other hand,
opponents believe that simply unlocking the local
loop will never make it ripe for competition because
the dynamics of the local exchange make the vast
majority of it fundamentally immune to competi-
tion,9" and because the FCC currently is too ab-
sorbed to enforce any safeguards, structural or non-
structural."
II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS - THE
MERGERS
The recent wave of mergers suggests an environ-
ment far different from that of the deal driven
1980s,"8 but underneath all the verbiage, these deals
still may reflect the traditional desire for market
clout, albeit with a technological twist. These merg-
ers are premised upon the gamble that emerging
technologies "will reward those with the nerve to
plug in.""' Although it remains to be seen whether
this merger frenzy will last, some believe that inves-
tors discouraged by current low interest rates will
seek the higher returns that stocks have to offer, thus
driving up share prices and continuing to fuel the
present merger euphoria. 5
A. The AT&T-McCaw Merger
AT&T Chairman Robert Allen has a vision of
89 Mike Moeller, No Turning Back, COMM. INT'L, Feb.
1994, at 14.
90 Toth, supra note 78, at 51.
' At the present time, the capital investment in both the lo-
cal loop and the switching equipment have made the market of
the LECs virtually unassailable. Chris L. Kelley, The Contest-
ability of the Local Network; The FCC's Open Network Archi-
tecture Policy, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 89, 135 (1992). The local
loop is generally regarded as a natural monopoly because the
principal resources needed to connect local end users to nation-
wide central office switches prevent reproduction of the local net-
work. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Adam Smith Assaults Ma Bell
with His Invisible Hands: Divestiture, Deregulation and the
Need for a New Telecommunications Policy, 11 HAST. COMM.!
ENT. L.J. 527, 593 (1989). The economic barriers to entering
the local loop may be created not by the technology itself, but
instead by the tremendous expenses required to create a new
system able to compete with the existing residential telephone
network. Id. It is Dempsey's belief that, at some point, a less
costly alternative system may be derived from cable television,
two-way radio or satellites that will be able to compete within
"anytime, anywhere communications."" The pro-
posed merger of AT&T and McCaw brings to the
existing cellular market the heretofore missing ele-
ment of long-distance, and ensures AT&T a key role
in shaping the future of PCS and mobile computing.
This investment promises to provide AT&T with the
capability to deliver end-to-end wireless service, from
the end user's CPE to network services. 7
The merger gives AT&T, better known for its
long-distance service, control over the nation's largest
cellular telephone company, while enabling McCaw
to market its wireless services under AT&T's name
and to utilize the vast resources of Bell Laborato-
ries.9 8 The proposed merger would result in the
ownership of cellular operations in 105 markets na-
tionwide, 9 and would enable both companies to use
their resources more efficiently.
In addition, this merger will stimulate competition
within the entire wireless industry. 0 Unquestion-
ably, AT&T has the best ability of any of the inter-
exchange carriers to capitalize on the growing user
interest in wireless services and products, because it
has been active in the wireless market for years and
has experience in many different market segments.101
The real significance of the merger inevitably lies in
the potential for increasing competition in the cellu-
lar industry and the possibility of lower prices-all
of which only can benefit the consumer.
Competitors' fears that AT&T is seeking to re-
enter the local telephone market may be unfounded,
due to the fact that AT&T is unlikely to be able to
offer local telephone service directly to customers, be-
cause McCaw's cellular networks traditionally are
not suitable for this task. 02 In order for AT&T to
the local loop. Id.
" Toth, supra note 78, at 51.
91 Grant, supra note 14, at 49. Today's players are using
rapidly appreciating stock as currency, instead of the junk bonds
and huge debt that characterized the mega-deals of the past dec-
ade. Id. In addition, much of this merger activity is concentrated
solely in the industries of health care and telecommunications.
Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
Bart Ziegler, AT&T's Bold Bet, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 30,
1993, at 26.
"" Messmer & Wallace, supra note 9, at 31.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Bob Brown, Long-Haul Carriers Plot Wireless Paths,
NETWORK WORLD, Nov. 23, 1992, at 25-26.
101 Id. at 25.
102 Letter to the Editor, AT&T Local Services Are Not At
Hand, COMM. WEEK, Nov. 30, 1992, at 39.
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compete in the local market, AT&T will need to cre-
ate a "modular, distributed network" that relies
upon wireless technology and that functions "paral-
lel to the existing local exchange network." ' This
is not likely to come cheap,"" and AT&T officials
themselves acknowledge that it will not be easy to
build a network that will make all of these new ser-
vices possible.' 0 5
Industry analysts predict that the newly merged
AT&T will not attempt to compete directly with lo-
cal phone service systems that remain heavily regu-
lated, but will instead try to tap into certain seg-
ments of wireless consumers.' 0 6 To that end, AT&T
may produce wireless devices geared for specific bus-
iness users, such as taxi drivers and package
handlers.10 7
Nonetheless, the RBOCs, particularly NY-
NEX, 08 BellSouth and Bell Atlantic, remain vocal
in their expectation that the AT&T-McCaw merger
ultimately will provide wireless service that bypasses
the switches owned by the local exchanges.' 0 9 The
RBOCs want a reversal of the restrictions imposed
upon them through the MFJ so that they can com-
pete on an equal footing with AT&T and the other
IXCs in the interexchange services market.
In an effort to compel AT&T to obtain approval
from Judge Greene before merging with McCaw,
BellSouth filed a petition with the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia on December 2,
1993, arguing that such a merger would violate the
103 Id.
o Hyatt, supra note 11, at 33.
100 Mulqueen, supra note 1, at 1.
106 Hyatt, supra note 11, at 33.
107 Id.
... NYNEX is the parent company of New England Tele-
phone and New York Telephone.
100 Hyatt, supra note 11, at 33.
10 AT&T Says McCaw Merger Will Go Through, COM-
MON CARRIER WEEK, Jan. 10, 1994, at 4. The specific provi-
sion in contention is the MFJ prohibition of AT&T acquiring
any assets of divested Bell Operating Companies. Id. See also
DOJ's Response to BellSouth's Motion For a Declaratory Rul-
ing, United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc. (D.D.C. filed
Jan. 5, 1994) (No. 82-0192 HHG). BellSouth argues that be-
cause McCaw has a minority interest in cellular properties in
which Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Pacific Telesis and
SouthWestern Bell hold minority interest, AT&T cannot obtain
financial interest in any of the RBOCs without first obtaining a
waiver from this specific MFJ provision. Id.
For its part, AT&T has insisted that prohibition applies only
to the reacquiring of local exchange assets held at the time of
divestiture in 1984. AT&T Says McCaw Merger Will Go
Through, COMMON CARRIER WEEK, Jan. 10, 1994, at 4. How-
ever, the DOJ disagreed, finding that AT&T's interpretation
"strains the plain language of the (MFJ) . . . ." DOJ's Re-
MFJ, and would require a modification or waiver of
the decree before it could be approved." 0 BellSouth
stated that while it has no interest in obstructing the
AT&T-McCaw merger, it is seeking to ensure
"competitive equity and the ability to operate under
the same rules.""'
On April 5, 1994, Judge Greene agreed with the
position adopted by the RBOCs and ruled that
AT&T's purchase of McCaw "would indeed violate
the plain and express language of the [MFJ] de-
cree.""' However, Judge Greene's ruling left open
the possibility that he may yet approve the merger,
once AT&T has clearly proven to him that the
union with McCaw would be in the public
interest."'
Where nearly all state regulatory agencies have
approved the merger,"" and where the DOJ has
made it clear that AT&T must obtain a waiver of
the MFJ before its merger with McCaw can be
completed,"' it remains to be seen whether Judge
Greene and the FCC will allow the AT&T/McCaw
merger to come to fruition.
B. The Bygone Bell Atlantic-TCI Merger
Like AT&T, Bell Atlantic believes it can achieve
its vision of becoming the world's best communica-
tions and information company." 6 On October 13,
1993, Bell Atlantic, TCI1 7 and Liberty Media" 8
announced a corporate union designed to create a
sponse to BellSouth's Motion, at 4.
The most reasonable reading of section I(D) is that it ap-
plies to any acquisition of the stock or assets of a BOC,
irrespective of when or how the stock or assets in question
came to be owned by the BOC .... Moreover, the acqui-
sitions at issue here would result in AT&T and a Re-
gional Company becoming partners in the provision of an
exchange and an exchange access service.
Id. at 8.
' DOJ's Response to Bellsouth's Motion, supra note 110,
at 4.
"'s John Burgess & Sandra Sugawara, AT&T, McCaw
Cellular Deal Is Blocked by Federal Judge, WASH. POST, Apr.
6, 1994, at Al, A6.
113 Id.
"" AT&T Says McCaw Merger Will Go Through Despite
MFJ Problem, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 7, 1994, at 3.
"' See Memorandum in Opposition for AT&T's Motion
for Waiver of Section 1(D), United States v. Western Electric
Co., Inc. (D.D.C. filed Jan. 5, 1994) (No. 82-0192 HHG).
"1 Raymond Smith, COMM. WEEK, Jan. 3, 1994, at 25.
17 TCI is the largest cable television company in the world,
serving more than 20% of U.S. cable customers, with 1,200 cable
systems serving 10 million subscribers in 48 states, Puerto Rico,
and the District of Columbia. The New Bell Atlantic: Wow!
Merger With TCI, Liberty Media Changes Us Forever, BELL
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premier communications, information and entertain-
ment company." 9 The proposed $26 billion merger
was one of the largest in corporate history, with a
combined total of twenty-two million cable, wireless
and phone customers spread across fifty-nine of the
nation's top one hundred markets, and was expected
to be completed in late 1994.120 The transaction ef-
fectively would have combined TCI's cable proper-
ties and Liberty Media's programming assets with
those of Bell Atlantic.
This landmark deal would have resulted in a
much-needed upgrade to the local telephone infra-
structure, and a wealth of high-tech gadgets for the
consumer, including video-on-demand and home
shopping. 2' In addition, the two companies had ex-
pressed their intent eventually to provide nationwide
broadband technology for business and home users
as an alternative to the BOCs." 2
By uniting telephone, cable and wireless networks
in both the national and international markets with
cutting edge video-on-demand and new interactive
multimedia technologies, Bell Atlantic and TCI be-
lieved their alliance would have accelerated the im-
plementation of both the new "information super-
highway" as well as full-service networks of new
products and services. 2 But the reality may be that
the failure of the proposed merge ultimately will
benefit the consumer by keeping viable the competi-
tion between cable and video-on-demand offerings.'" 4
Although the merger with TCI did not come to
fruition for Bell Atlantic, it is unquestionable that
ATLANTIC WEEK, Oct. 18, 1993.
11. Liberty Media has extensive programming interests in
the Black Entertainment Network, the Family Channel, QVC,
the Home Shopping Network and many sports programming
channels. Id. The company also has a partial ownership interest
in 17 cable companies serving some three million subscribers. Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Mary Thyfault, Cable Ready - Bell Atlantic-TCI
Promises Business a Much-Needed Upgrade to the Local Phone
Infrastructure, INFO. WEEK, Oct. 18, 1993, at 12.
122 Id.
12 Id. Bell Atlantic's Raymond Smith indicated that his
company will complete fiber optic video network capabilities in
some areas within its region next year, and within Bell Atlan-
tic's foremost 20 markets by 1998. Id.
12. This is because video-on-demand and cable offerings pro-
vide essentially the same service, although video-on-demand may
be marginally more expensive. Rich Brown, Executives Peer
Into Future; Disagree Over Cost, Timing of Predicted 500
Channels, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 6, 1993, at 10.
Therefore, because phone companies such as Bell Atlantic are
now able to provide video-on-demand, and because cable compa-
nies such as TCI provide cable services, a merger of the two
could result in a monopoly of the video market in a given service
another cable/telco merger is not far behind. The
proposed deal undoubtedly benefitted Bell Atlantic
by prompting the company to begin its quest to over-
come legal and regulatory obstacles, such as seeking
a federal waiver of the MFJ restriction that prohib-
its regional phone companies from interexchange
transmission. '"
Some believe that the failure of this merger may
serve to check the recent wave of merger mania
among communications companies, many of whom
had felt pressure to compete with the high-profile
Bell Atlantic-TCI deal.' 26 Despite the deceleration
in large corporate mergers, increased competition
among telephone, cable and entertainment compa-
nies, as well as technology itself, inevitably will pro-
vide those services sought to be achieved by the Bell
Atlantic-TCI merger."' In addition, historically it
has been the small companies that have been the
technological innovators and not the immense con-
glomerates who, if they do create a new product or
service or technology, tend to sit on a discovery until
it suits their pecuniary purposes.' 28
C. Additional Telco Mergers
Two additionally notable telecommunications
mergers also took place in 1993, between MCI and
BT, and between Sprint and Centel, Inc. These
mergers reflect an effort to increase competition
within the interexchange market. Furthermore, by
pooling resources to add cellular and wireless com-
area. This could have significant implications for the consumer
in terms of price and viewing choice, in addition to the effect of
cutting out any possible competition from smaller video and
cable service providers.
128 COMM. DAILY, Jan. 24, 1994, at 4. On January 20,
1994, Bell Atlantic filed a petition with the DOJ requesting a
waiver of the MFJ decree in order to provide long distance tele-
phone service outside of its region and to deliver satellite pro-
gramming nationwide. Id. In its petition, Bell Atlantic indicated
that the desired waiver would "let merged companies pursue
plans to compete aggressively with other telephone companies
outside Bell Atlantic's region and with existing cable companies
inside its region." Id. Bell Atlantic needed this approval because
the satellite distribution system used by programmers such as
TCI is considered to be a form of long-distance service. The
New Bell Atlantic: Wow! Merger with TCI Changes Us For-
ever, BELL ATLANTIC WEEK, Oct. 18, 1993.
126 Sugawara & Farhi, supra note 13, at All.
127 Id. at Al.
128 Case in point: AT&T's Bell Laboratories developed the
concept of cellular in 1947, then sat on it until the first tests
were conducted to explore commercial applications in 1962.
Charles Maslin, Outline of the History of Cellular 2, 1993, at 2
(citing A Brief History of Cellular (CTIA)).
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munications to their existing networks, these compa-
nies have become more attractive to consumers of in-
terexchange services. 2 These mergers arguably are
in response to actions taken by AT&T and the
RBOCs and are further indications of the trend to-
wards vertical integration.
1. The MCI-British Telecom Merger
On June 2, 1993, MCI sold a twenty percent
stake in the company to BT for $4.3 billion in cash.
Analysts have characterized the deal, which is to be
completed by early 1994, as evidence of the need for
major telecommunications players to create alliances
in order to compete effectively in the global
marketplace. 3 °
The deal enables MCI and BT not only to com-
bine revenues-primarily from voice services-in or-
der to compete on a more even footing with rival
AT&T, but also to establish a customer base on both
sides of the Atlantic, something AT&T has yet to
achieve.13" ' Pinning its hopes on the new digital wire-
less technology of PCS networks expected to become
a reality in 1994, MCI wants to use this new wire-
less technology as an access link into MCI's long-
distance network."3 2 In August 1993, an MCI
spokesperson indicated that after the FCC has allo-
cated the radio frequencies for PCS, MCI's main
strategy for wireless communications was to assem-
ble a consortium' 3 that would offer low-cost PCS
services.' The pending deal between AT&T-Mc-
Caw could put pressure on MCI to invest in cellular
operations which MCI sold off to McCaw""8 in the
1980s.' MCI has indicated its desire to invest in
cellular with much of the cash it will receive from its
new partner, BT.' Although AT&T has taken the
lead in the wireless revolution, MCI, like Sprint,
should be able to move more quickly than its colossal
12' Robin Gareiss, Users Like MCI Plan to Take On Local
Carriers, COMM. WEEK, Jan. 10, 1994, at 1.
130 MCI Gets 4.3 Billion in Cash; BT MCI Purchase, Pro-
viding Cash Infusion And Global Partner, COMM. WEEK, June
3, 1993, at 1.
1 Global Carriers: The Race Is On, DATA COMM. July
1993, at 64.
122 Brown, supra note 100, at 25.
122 For further details of this consortium, see Baron, supra
note 41.
184 Id.
125 Brown, supra note 100, at 26.
12S Id.
127 Kent Gibbons, AT&T To Acquire No. 1 Cellular Firm;
McCaw Deal May Open a Wireless Era, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
17, 1993, at Al.
rival, AT&T, due to its smaller infrastructure.18
Like AT&T and Bell Atlantic, MCI also believes
in a "sweeping strategic vision" that will facilitate
the company's attempt to deliver voice, data and
video services over the MCI network. "' In an effort
to step up competition in the local exchange market,
MCI announced its intention in January of 1994 to
invest $20 billion in its long-distance network over a
six year period in order to increase the carrying ca-
pacity of its current system, and to assemble new
networks in twenty metropolitan areas. 40
While both MCI and some users expect MCI's
plan ultimately to result in lower prices and greater
quality, as with AT&T's plan, it remains to be seen
whether the company's savings from access charges
will be passed on to the consumer, and whether such
actions constitute vertical integration practices or
truly are in the public interest.
2. The Sprint-Centel Merger
As of April 21, 1993, Sprint, the nation's third
largest long-distance carrier, and Centel, the Chi-
cago-based cellular provider, effectively became one
company with the creation of Sprint Cellular Co.'"
Having acquired Centel for approximately $3 billion
in stock, the merger strengthened Sprint by greatly
increasing its cash flow.'"2 The merger made Sprint
the first telecommunications company able to offer
customers a complete package of local, long-distance
and cellular services.' 43 The question is, however,
does such seamless service represent vertical
integration?
Sprint Cellular's President Dennis Foster stated
that the company would concentrate on expanding
the choice of wireless services offered, including digi-
tal, personal telephone service, flexible rates, single
billing and seamless service.144 Foster also indicated
ISO Brown, supra note 100, at 26. Because MCI and Sprint
have smaller infrastructures than AT&T, if MCI and Sprint
chose to integrate new wireless technologies into their networks,
they should be able to do so more quickly than rival AT&T. Id.
, Gareiss, supra note 129, at 1.
140 Id. Some believe the significance of this decision may ri-
val that of Bell Atlantic and AT&T. Id.
141 Industry Update, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 22, 1993, at
25.
142 John T. Mulqueen, Will Sprint-Centel Benefit Users,
COMM. WEEK, June 1, 1993, at 8.
14' Linda Wilson, Look, Ma, No Layoffs - Centel Uses
Automatic Dialers to Centralize Functions, Not Staff, INFO.
WEEK, Dec. 7, 1993, at 73.
144 COMM. DAILY, Mar. 10, 1993, at 8.
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that Sprint Cellular would be looking to form alli-
ances with other companies, saying, "the future be-
longs to innovative companies that can forge alli-
ances quickly to develop and bring ideas to the
market first and best."" 6 Ironically, Sprint sold off
its cellular operation in the 1980s to none other than
Centel, and through its recent merger is seeking to
recapture the cellular market it gave away. " "
As with the AT&T-McCaw merger, analysts and
some network business managers have indicated that
this deal does not necessarily mean that any new ser-
vices will be developed from the combined com-
pany. 14 7 The idea that "nothing stands out" in terms
of immediate benefit to users has been a recurring
theme chanted by many who view these telecommu-
nications mergers as insignificant until the tangible
benefit to the consumer, whether in the form of
product or savings, has been proven. " 8
D. Additional Cable Mergers
Mergers such as Paramount-Viacom and U.S.
West-Time Warner are clearly about one princi-
ple-content; whoever owns it, controls it. Thus, the
coveted deals with the major Hollywood studios over
programming are considered to be lucrative, yet, be-
cause of the scarcity of the resource, acquiring the
programming rights to film and television perform-
ances can be quite expensive.
1. The Paramount-Viacom Merger
Nowhere is the desire to control the content sent
over the superhighway more evident than in the bat-
tle over Paramount. On February 15, 1994, after a
bitter five-month battle with rival QVC, Inc., cable
television company Viacom, Inc."" acquired Para-
mount Communications, Inc. for the arguably in-
145 Id.
146 Brown, supra note 100, at 26.
147 Mulqueen, supra note 142, at 8.
148 Id.
, Viacom owns programming assets such as MTV and
Showtime, in addition to cable systems which serve 1.2 million
households. Paul Farhi, Blockbuster, Viacom Plan to Merge,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1994, at Al.
"' Paul Farhi, Viacom's Bid Wins Paramount, WASH.
POST, Feb. 16, 1994, at Al.
18 Moeller, supra note 21, at 24. On January 7, 1994, the
boards of both Viacom and Blockbuster Entertainment approved
the details of their merger. Farhi, supra note 150, at Al. Last
Fall, Blockbuster committed $600 million to Viacom in the wake
of the battle with QVC over Paramount, thus insuring a future
for itself when cable and telcos are capable of transmitting innu-
flated price of $10.1 billion. " ' The contest between
QVC and Viacom over Paramount provided the in-
dustry with powerful evidence of the lengths to
which communications companies will go in order to
provide the films, game shows, and cable series to
consumers via delivery-on-demand.'
Paramount is such a desirable possession because
few companies are able to rival Paramount's wealth
of programming assets."' As John C. Malone, Chief
Executive Officer of TCI has stated: "Over time, the
hardware (to deliver programming) will become ge-
neric. The key is going to be programming
software."' ' In the end, however, the contest was
simply a numbers game, with both Wall Street and
Viacom shareholders favoring the lower Viacom bid
because it offered more cash and thus greater protec-
tion should Viacom stock perform poorly,1 ' which it
has.15
5
The Bell Atlantic-TCI deal made the Paramount-
Viacom merger more interesting, permitting Viacom
to raise concerns about the monopolistic intentions of
TCI because TCI owns a one third interest in QVC
and was a key financial backer in QVC's pursuit of
Paramount.15 6 QVC's failed deal, like that of Bell
Atlantic-TCI is important because if QVC had suc-
ceeded in its efforts to capture Paramount, and if
Bell Atlantic had completed the merger with TCI,
TCI would have had absolute control over content as
well as infrastructure. Thus, arguably, Bell Atlantic-
TCI would have been a vertically-integrated entity.
2. The U.S. West-Time Warner Merger
On September 15, 1994, U.S. West acquired a
25.51% interest in Time Warner, Inc., for $2.5 bil-
lion in cash, providing U.S. West with vital access to
the vast cable,157 entertainment and media operations
merable films over their wires, thus making video stores some-
what obsolete. Id.
15 Paul Farhi, Egos, Interactive Visions Fuel Bitter Para-
mount Fight, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1994, at Fl. As "[tlhe owner
of one of Hollywood's Golden Age studios, Paramount is one of
perhaps only six companies on earth capable of producing and
distributing American-made films and TV programs around the
world." Id.
18 Id.
154 Paul Wiseman, QVC Stands Pat on Bid for Paramount,
USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 1994, at B1.
185 Farhi, supra note 152.
18e Wiseman, supra note 154, at BI.
157 Time Warner's cable division services 7.1 million cus-
tomers nationwide. A Cascade of Mergers and Alliances Make
1993 A Watershed for Telecoms, INFO. NETWORKS, Jan. 10,
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of Time Warner. " ' In exchange for its program-
ming, this merger provides Time Warner with a
healthy cash infusion and an infrastructure already
in place, and enables the company to utilize the ex-
pertise of U.S. West in constructing and operating
switched networks and telephone operations. 159
/The significance of the U.S. West-Time Warner
merger is similar to that of the failed Bell Atlantic-
TCI proposal-the union of a cable or entertain-
ment company's invaluable programming resources
with that of the expensive infrastructure and expert
operational capabilities of an RBOC.' 60 If the U.S.
West-Time Warner alliance is successful in building
interactive networks to transmit communications, in-
formation and entertainment,16' the merger most
likely will secure an enviable position on the infor-
mation superhighway.
III. FUTURE IMPACT OF THE MERGERS
The average time for completion of each of the
proposed mergers is estimated to take between nine
and twelve months, due to the need for approval
from the FCC and the DOJ, as well as from state
regulatory agencies.' 62 In addition, under the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act,"' parties seeking to engage in
mergers or joint ventures surpassing $100 million
are required by law to notify the DOJ's antitrust di-
vision and the Federal Trade Commission. 164 FCC
Commissioner Quello has said that although the
FCC "must keep an open mind" to any opposition, a
merger such as that of AT&T and McCaw "pos-
sesses great future potential for national and global
growth."'""
A. Antitrust Concerns
Both AT&T and Bell Atlantic have come under
1994, at 3.
166 Barrett, supra note 64, at 46.
169 Id.
160 The FCC has granted an 18 month waiver of the cable
cross-ownership rules to U.S. West. A Cascade of Mergers and
Alliances Make 1993 A Watershed for Telecoms, INFO. NET-
WORKS, Jan. 10, 1994, at 3.
161 Id.
16 AT&T has stated that by December 31, 1993, all states
with the single exception of California had approved the merger
with McCaw, and that the only regulatory approvals remaining
were DOJ's review of the antitrust implications of the merger
and the FCC's review of applications for transfer of control of
McCaw radio licenses. BellSouth Wins and Loses; AT&T Says
McCaw Merger Will Go Through Despite MFJ Problem,
COMM. DAILY, Jan. 7, 1994, at 2.
intense scrutiny for the antitrust ramifications of
their proposed mergers. Congress, the FCC and the
DOJ will be reviewing all aspects of mergers such as
the AT&T-McCaw and the Paramount-Viacom un-
ions for possible antitrust violations. One issue is
whether mergers between cable and telcos support
free market competition or create "mega-
monopolies.' 66
1. Antitrust Statutes
The Sherman Act, enacted on July 2, 1890, pro-
vides that "every . .. combination in the form of
trust or otherwise . . in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States or with Foreign Na-
tions is declared to be illegal."' 6 Section 2 of the Act
states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...."'" Pursuant
to the Act, corporations engaged in illegal monopo-
lies may face up to ten million dollars in fines.'69 In
practice, the Sherman Act has failed as an effective
safeguard against mergers that might mar competi-
tion, because courts generally have interpreted the
Act to forbid mergers only where they were designed
to create a monopoly and intended to do so. 170 Most
mergers are able to survive such a feeble standard.17'
The Clayton Act, enacted on October 15, 1914,
provides that "[n]o person engaged in commerce or
in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, di-
rectly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock ... or assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce,
where ... the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
Is 15 U.S.C.S. § 1311 (1993). This Act supplements the
Clayton Act of 1914 (15 U.S.C. § 12) and clarifies antitrust ter-
minology and responsibilities of the DOJ agents involved in the
enforcement of antitrust law.
164 Carla Lazzareschi & Jude Shriver, AT&T Will Buy
McCaw Cellular for $2.6 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1993, at
Al. The government can approve, negotiate to restructure the
deal, or sue to block it. Id.
1685 Id.
"I M.E.T., Sidebar; Don't Pop The Cork Yet, INFO.
WEEK, Oct. 18, 1993, at 13.
17 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
'as 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
169 Id.
170 GELLHORN, supra note 18, at 339-40.
171 Id.
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monopoly." '172 The Clayton Act raised the relatively
low standards set by the Sherman Act by making it
possible to restrain mergers which "merely lessened"
competition. 7 Thus, the Clayton Act is more effec-
tive than its predecessor, because the Act enables a
merger to be halted before any significant damage to
competition has occurred. 174 While the language of
the two statutes taken together would appear to pre-
clude the existence of almost any merger, as a gen-
eral rule, mergers can serve useful and legitimate so-
cial and business purposes without impairing
competition. 175 The task of antitrust merger law thus
is to eliminate only those mergers whose adverse af-
fect on competition substantially outweighs its bene-
fits. 176 With a current crop of proposed mergers that
closely resemble vertically integrated entities-Para-
mount-Viacom, U.S. West-Time Warner-and the
possibility of another merger similar to Bell Atlantic-
TCI, the real question is whether the government
should allow this trend to continue.
2. Legislative and Executive Action
Congress also is concerning itself with the anti-
trust implications of these mergers, through the in-
troduction of two bills, H.R. 3636 and H.R. 3626.
The House Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance currently is in the process of debating
H.R. 3636, the "National Communications Compe-
tition and Information Infrastructure Act of 1993," a
bill that essentially would lift the 1984 Cable Act's
ban on joint ownership of telephone and cable facili-
ties in the same service area.7 7 Under H.R. 3636,
telephone companies would be able to provide video
programming directly to subscribers in their tele-
phone service area,'17 but also would have to provide
access and interconnection to alternate carriers such
as cable companies. 17 9 If Congress passes H.R. 3636
172 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
"' GELLHORN, supra note 18, at 342.
174 Id. The Clayton Act was applicable to both vertical and
horizontal mergers. Id.
" Id. at 334-35.
178 Id. at 335-36.
177 H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Democratic
Representative Edward J. Markey, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, intends to
hold hearings on the issue of media concentration and its impact
on consumers and competition. Markey also had intended to
hold hearings on the implications of the Bell Atlantic-TCI
merger in particular. As of this writing, the Committee still was
conducting hearings on H.R. 3636.
178 Id. § 102.
179 Id.
and the Fourth Circuit affirms the C&P decision,
the telco industry in essence will have slain their Go-
liath, thus easing their passage through the regula-
tory approval process.
H.R. 3626,80 entitled the "Antitrust Reform Act
of 1993," effectively would supersede the MFJ in
permitting the BOCs to provide interexchange tele-
communications through the acquisition and resale
of telecommunications equipment.' 8 ' The BOCs are
pinning their hopes on the passage of H.R. 3626,
and should the bill prevail, AT&T may no longer be
the only king on the interexchange throne.
One central goal of the Clinton administration is
the development of the National Information Infra-
structure ("Nil").182 If the Nil is any indication, it
is quite probable that "over the next three years, the
federal government will move to a much more cen-
tralized, interventionist approach than that which
has prevailed for the past 2 decades."' 83 Recent
speeches by Vice President Gore support this conten-
tion and signify that the approach taken by the Clin-
ton administration is anything but laissez-faire.
In a December 1993 speech at the National Press
Club in Washington, D.C., Vice President Gore
stated that the Clinton administration supported
long-term removal of judicial and regulatory re-
straints that prevent telecommunications companies
from entering each other's businesses."' Gore ac-
knowledged, however, the necessity of balancing free
competition with regulations created to shield the
public from potential monopoly abuses. 8 ' Gore
stated that the Clinton administration's proposals to
reform the communications marketplace would be
guided by five specific principles: 1) to encourage
private investment; 2) to promote and protect compe-
tition; 3) to provide open access to the network; 4) to
preserve and advance universal service in order to
avoid creating a society of information "haves and
180 H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This bill is
sponsored by Representatives Brooks and Dingell.
1 1 Id. § 101. This provision goes into effect 18 months after
the enactment of this Act. Id. Within five years the BOCs would
be allowed to provide interstate telecommunications within their
own territories, and after a one year period, the BOCs would be
permitted to manufacture or provide CPE. Id. § 102.
182 NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., THE NATIONAL IN-
FORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION (Sept. 15,
1993).
188 COMM. DAILY, Jan. 5, 1994, at 5.
18 Vice-President; NIl Judicial, Regulatory Restraints to be
Removed, INFO. NETWORKS, Jan. 8, 1994, at 10.
185 Id.
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have nots"; and 5) to encourage flexible and respon-
sive government action so that the newly adopted
regulatory framework can keep pace with the rapid
technological and market changes that pervade the
telecommunications and information industries.'" 6
In another speech before the Academy of Televi-
sion Arts and Sciences, Gore indicated the adminis-
tration's intent to open up the local telephone ex-
changes, with the expectation that increasing
competition will result in continuing advancements
in technology, in the quality of services and in lower
costs.' 8 7 At the same time however, he emphasized
that the Clinton administration would "insist upon
safeguards to ensure that new corporate freedoms
will not be translated into sudden and unjustified
rate increases for telephone consumers. "188
Acting on the Clinton administration's desire to
rewrite the Communications Act of 1934 to include a
new provision that would regulate entities such as
merged telco and cable companies,' 8" the Senate re-
cently has proposed legislation that would implement
the first comprehensive revision of the Communica-
tions Act since its inception in 1934.190 One major
problem with such a proposal, however, is that it is
nearly impossible to create a long-term, stable, regu-
latory environment when revolutionary technology
and market merger frenzy make it "almost impossi-
ble to totally update the policy framework in one
sweeping effort. ' "'
'" Vice President Proposes National Telecommunications
Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESI-
DENT, Jan. 11, 1994, at 1. See also Background on the Adminis-
tration's Telecommunications Policy Reform Initiative, NA-
TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, (NTIA White Paper). In his January 11,
1994 speech before the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences,
Gore stated: "[in the information marketplace of the future, we
will obtain our goals of investment, competition and open access
only if regulation matches the marketplace. That requires a flex-
ible, adaptable regulatory scheme that encourages the wide-
spread provision of broadband, interactive digital services." Vice
President Proposes National Telecommunications Reform, THE
WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, Jan. 11,
1994, at 7.
187 Vice President Al Gore, Remarks at the Television
Academy on the Administration's Vision of The National Infor-
mation Infrastructure (Jan. 11, 1994).
lea Id.
ISO Id.
190 Statement of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
Public Notice (Feb. 23, 1994), para. 1. Labeled "The Commu-
nications Act of 1994," proposed bill S. 1822 attempts to reform
3. Agency Action - FCC
In determining whether to approve these mergers,
the Commission must consider the eminent goals of
the public interest, universal service, fostering com-
petition, and efficiently managing valuable spectrum.
The Communications Act of 1934 is premised upon
the phrase "the public interest, convenience and ne-
cessity,"'' 92 a standard that the Commission must ad-
here to in all of its decisions. The public interest is
an elastic standard that changes over time,"' and
thus must be reevaluated in this era of telecommuni-
cations convergence and momentous technological
transformation.
The question of whether the merger of technologi-
cal giants such as AT&T-McCaw and the formerly
proposed Bell Atlantic-TCI are truly in the public
interest remains to be seen."' According to NBC
West Coast President, Donald Ohlmeyer, if the Bell
Atlantic-TCI merger had been approved, "you
[would have had] 2 guys deciding what 50 million
people are going to see .... That's kind of scary.""' 5
He may not be alone in his assessment.
The Communications Act of 1934 mandated the
FCC to "make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-
wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges
.... ""e Universal service is the public policy goal of
providing widespread availability of basic, quality
telephone service to every American household at a
reasonable price. 9 ' As basic telephone service is up-
three essential aspects of telecommunication law: 1) it returns to
Congress primary responsibility for creating national communi-
cations policy; 2) it provides the FCC with the legislative au-
thorization needed to effectively open up monopolistic markets to
competition, while ensuring consumer protection; and 3) it em-
phasizes the U.S.'s commitment to the goals of universal service
and to the ideal that all Americans should reap the benefits of
the emerging technology revolution. Id. paras. 13-14.
191 COMM. DAILY, Jan. 5, 1994, at 5.
192 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 302 (1988).
103 In re Limitations on Commercial Time on Television
Broadcast, Notice of Inquiry, 8 FCC Rcd. 7277, para. 6 (1993).
'"" As of this writing, AT&T's application for transfer of
control of McCaw's cellular licenses is still pending due to re-
quests from several RBOCs to extend the reply deadline to Jan.
18, 1994. See In re Application for Consent to Transfer Control,
(AT&T & McCaw), ENF-93-44 (pending). Thus the Commis-
sion has yet to state whether such a merger is in the public
interest.
195 'Shivers in Hollywood'; Violence Is an Issue in Critics'
Tour for NBC, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 11, 1994, at 5.
'8* 47 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
197 Warren G. Lavey, The Public Policies That Changed
the Telephone Industry Into Regulated Monopolies: Lessons
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graded and becomes obsolete in the wake of cellular
and fiber optic technology, the question becomes
where does universal service end, and with what
technological medium? Arguments such as spectrum
scarcity,198 traditionally offered by the FCC to jus-
tify its regulation of the broadcast industry, become
less credible as the profusion of technology becomes
more ubiquitous and the methods of transporting
programming and information more abundant. 99
The concept of universal service must not be lost
along the "information superhighway," for then
technology becomes a reward for only those who can
afford to climb aboard. National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration ("NTIA") Di-
rector of International Affairs, Jean Prewitt, ques-
tioned: "[d]oes [convergence] hold promise for closing
the gap or merely redefining the terms of telephone
efficiency for rich and poor? If that's true, we all
lose." '00 It ultimately will be up to the FCC to de-
termine if, and to what extent, such mergers are con-
ducted in accordance with the ideals of universal ser-
vice °.2 0  Now that the future promises an abundance
of communications innovations, the challenge for the
Commission will be to tailor the old regulatory poli-
cies, once premised on a system of communications
scarcity, into more "appropriate reregulation."' ' 2
The key to such regulation will lie in precisely iden-
tifying to what extent regulators should intervene in
a medium rapidly approaching ubiquity.
20 3
FCC Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett sees the
future role of regulators as focusing on competitive
From Around 1915, 39 FED. COM. L.J. 174 (1987). See also
Statement of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, supra note 190,
para. 18.
198 Spectrum scarcity is the conventional policy behind the
idea that, because there is a limited amount of spectrum availa-
ble for public use (necessarily because the government itself has
chosen to limit the amount of spectrum offered for public con-
sumption), the government may chose to grant licenses to whom-
ever it believes to be most worthy, i.e., whoever most completely
satisfies the public interest, convenience and necessity analysis.
The government may regulate the activities of the licensee of a
broadcast or cable medium because the licensee is a "public trus-
tee" of the airwaves or cable system, a mere operator, never
truly an owner. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969).
10 For a detailed discussion of the defects of the scarcity ra-
tionale, see Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Market-
place Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 207,
221-26 (1982).
200 U.S. As 'Developing Nation'" Telecommunications Gaps
Remain Major Hurdle Among Developing Nations, COMM.
DAILY, Jan. 21, 1994, at 4.
20' While the proposed S. 1822 leaves the primary responsi-
bility for defining universal service to the states, Chairman
Hundt believes that the states must work with the FCC to for-
market entry conditions, service quality and the pos-
sible implementation of targeted subsidies, instead of
monitoring issues such as cost and price for monop-
oly local exchange services. 0" Barrett believes that
"[tlhe future role of regulators is likely to evolve
more toward oversight of several multimedia broad-
band providers and wireless PCS service
providers. '205
Referring to the difficult decisions on telecommu-
nications regulation currently facing the FCC, Bar-
rett stated that the goal must be to "maintain bal-
anced regulatory policies.""" The question then
becomes, who has the capacity and the resources to
regulate monopolistic entities such as Paramount-
Viacom and future mergers similar to the one pro-
posed by Bell Atlantic and TCI? Many industry
analysts do not believe that the FCC has the capacity
or the resources to undertake such a monumental
task,201 and at the moment, whether any regulatory
body does is uncertain.0
Inevitably, the nation's telecommunications policy
must adequately reflect and serve the "public inter-
est, convenience and necessity,"20 9 however, that
standard may be rearticulated in 1994 and in the fu-
ture. Through careful scrutiny of whether mergers
foster continued and healthy competition and satisfy
the venerable goal of universal service, Congress, the
Commission and the DOJ ultimately will determine
whether these mergers are in the public interest.
Should these mergers fall short of such standards,
the odds are against successful governmental and
mulate and administer a national universal service policy that is
consistent. Statement of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, supra
note 190, paras. 18-19.
202 Paul Saffo, Looking Ahead to the Next Decade, COMM.
WEEK, Jan. 3, 1994, at 52.
203 Id.
204 Barrett & Marchant, supra note 32, at 4.
205 Id.
208 Rate Rules 'Oversold', COMM. DAILY, Jan. 10, 1994, at
3.
207 This task is arguably different from that presented to the
FCC at the time of divestiture because in 1994 there are more
players engaging in various kinds of heretofore unattempted
mergers, crossing the ownership boundaries of cable and telco in
an effort to converge different types of technology. Here, the
FCC would be charged with regulating a multitude of vertically
integrated entities, as opposed to one divested AT&T and seven
RBOCs.
20 Chairman Hundt has emphasized that both the FCC and
the states must have the regulatory flexibility and discretion to
manage and supervise the transition to effective competition, in
order to ensure that rates remain just and reasonable. Statement
of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, supra note 190, paras. 6, 29.
209 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 302 (1988).
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regulatory approval.
B. Impact On Competition
While the RBOCs may be the losers in the
AT&T-McCaw merger, it is equally possible that
the merger will provide the RBOCs with the oppor-
tunity that they have been seeking, namely to be per-
mitted to enter the interexchange market from which
they have been barred since the divestiture of AT&T
in 1984. By extending its network directly to con-
sumers through McCaw's cellular phone systems,
the RBOCs theorize that AT&T is developing a di-
rect link to the local exchange.210 The proposed
union of AT&T and McCaw does more for the
RBOCs than all the years of battling Congress and
the courts since the late 1980s, for it provides the
Bells with quid pro quo ammunition in their quest
to enter the interexchange arena.2 1'
With one half of all cellular licenses originally re-
served for the RBOCs,21 2 they have been able to in-
vest heavily in cellular services, all seven RBOCs
ranking among the nation's ten biggest cellular com-
panies.2"' Each of the RBOCs and GTE appear to
have developed their own agendas for participating
in the explosive growth of the wireless communica-
tions market. Industry executives note, however, that
Bell Atlantic is close to a deal with BellSouth and
many independent telephone companies to build a
nationwide consortium for advanced wireless ser-
vices, whose primary goal is to bid for PCS radio
10 Ziegler, supra note 96, at 28. AT&T Chairman Robert
Allen attempted to assuage fears about the re-emergence of
AT&T into the local exchange markets by emphasizing that be-
cause 99% of all cellular calls begin and terminate in the wired
local network, cellular service is secondary to the local ex-
changes. Mulqueen, supra note 1, at 146. MCI Chairman Bert
Roberts stated that even if AT&T does take away some local
traffic, the proper resolution would not permit the RBOCs ac-
cess into the long-distance market, as this would recreate pre-
divestiture monopoly and would devastate, not foster, competi-
tion. Nancy Hass, The Solomon Solution, FINANCIAL WORLD,
Oct. 12, 1993, at 32. At present, the overwhelming majority of
all local customers still make use of the LECs to complete their
local calls, thus, Roberts sees no reason for any regulatory recon-
sideration until and unless these customers actually switch to an
alternative, non-LEC provider, such as an IXC. Id.
211 Id. If AT&T is physically able to bypass the local loop
in extending its interexchange service directly to all of McCaw's
cellular customers, the RBOCs argument that they should be
permitted to offer service outside of the local exchange has
greater merit.
"" In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Allow
the Selection from Among Mutually Exclusive Competing Cel-
lular Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries, Report
and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 175, paras. 30-41 (1984). Some observ-
licenses.21'
In the short term, the proposed merger of AT&T-
McCaw threatens the cellular market share of the
RBOCs and GTE, because the new AT&T would
be a unified rival with sufficiently deep pockets and
geographic reach to produce advanced wireless ser-
vices throughout the United States.21 ' Over the long
haul, if wireless telephones are able to replace the
traditional wired phone systems, it will be possible
for AT&T to reach its customers by bypassing the
local exchanges and thus saving itself billions of dol-
lars in access fees, a savings that may or may not be
passed on to the consumer.21 6
The loss of access charges21 7 would deprive the
RBOCs and GTE of their biggest and most profita-
ble source of revenue, 1 ' a blow which could result
in a $1 billion loss in annual revenues for each
RBOC, and a decrease of $300-400 million in an-
nual post-tax profits.21 9 If cellular and other compet-
itive technologies continue to find ways to bypass the
local exchange, the RBOCs will soon experience an
acute cash flow reduction-one that the RBOCs be-
lieve will disadvantage both the economy and the
consumers.
22 0
As both the Commission and the states promote
marketplace competition by knocking down de jure
barriers into the local loop, they become more likely
to rid the RBOCs of the remaining vestiges of the
MFJ that effectively have prohibited them from
competing fully in other markets. 22 However, with
the RBOCs heavily entrenched in a local exchange
ers believe this to be the primarily reason why price competition
failed to develop in the cellular market as initially anticipated.
"' Edmund L. Andrews, The AT&T Deal's Big Losers,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at Dl, D3.
214 Id.
215 Id.
"' Id. It is equally possible the average customer may never
see any price reduction, despite the fact that this windfall to
AT&T and the other interexchange carriers may be significant.
117 Access charges are paid to the LECs from the IXCs in
order to enable local customers to complete long-distance calls on
the local network. Moeller, supra note 89, at 14. Currently, in-
terexchange carriers are compelled to pay nearly forty cents out
of each dollar of revenue to the RBOCs for access. Id. These
access charges and intra-lata toll calls account for 40-55% of
LECs' telecommunications services revenues and 35-45% of total
revenues. Each RBOC could witness a 20% reduction in net-
work access and toll revenues over the next 5-10 years. Martyn
F. Roetter, Ph.D., synopsis of The Future of the RBOCs: Col-
lapse of the Cocoon, DR REP., July 1993.
218 Id.
219 Id.
120 Hass, supra note 210, at 32.
"I FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt approves of promoting
competitive entry into both the interexchange and the local ex-
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that is historically immune from competition,"'2 it is
the de facto barriers to entry that are fraught with
difficulties and will take more time to overcome.
FCC Commissioner Barrett stated that "[i]t is
likely that the natural monopoly of the local ex-
change market eventually will evolve into a local
multimedia and wireless services market, with multi-
ple competitors." '228 Barrett believes that advances in
technology make both the local exchange and wire-
less communications market fertile ground for com-
panies seeking new market recesses. 2 4
Addressing the prevailing fears that AT&T once
again will become the pre-divestiture dinosaur it had
been prior to 1984, there are compelling policy argu-
ments on both sides. On the one hand, the RBOCs
enjoy an extremely pervasive local monopoly, and to
keep them from extending such a monopoly any fur-
ther, perhaps they should be restrained from enter-
ing into areas such as data transmission, equipment
manufacture and long-distance service.225  But
equally as compelling is the argument that the
RBOCs should be released from their regulatory re-
straints as a means of keeping AT&T honest, and
ensuring competition.226 Telecommunications mega-
deals comprised of large cable companies, such as
TCI, Time Warner and Viacom, involve cable com-
panies planning to use their cable networks to build
their own interactive systems in conjunction with lo-
cal access provider partners.22 7 Such plans require
the obtaining of PCS licenses, which will become
cheaper and easier if the cellular companies are for-
bidden to compete in the bidding for the licenses.""
Computer and software conglomerates such as
Microsoft, Apple, and IBM, can be counted on to
rival Bell Atlantic with cutting edge programming
systems.229 In addition, new challengers are bound to
appear on the horizon, as the assault on the bounda-
change by lifting the remaining line-of-business restrictions of
the MFJ, and by returning the primary regulation of the
RBOCs to the FCC. Statement of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt,
supra note 190, paras. 14, 20-21. Hundt also supports. the
RBOCs in their quest to provide interexchange services and
equipment manufacturing, but over a period of time and subject
to adequate procedural safeguards that would preclude them
from wielding their market power in the local exchange to un-
dermine competition in new markets. Id. paras. 20-21, 23.
"2 See Kelley, supra note 91 and accompanying text.
m Federal Communications Commissioner Andrew C. Bar-
rett, Remarks at the Institute for International Research (Feb. 2,
1993).
114 Id.
"' Robert Reno, Communications Policy Seems to Be On
Perpetual Hold, NEWSDAY, Aug. 26, 1993, at 46.
226 Id.
227 Landler, supra note 15, at 35.
ries of the marketplace continues. 2 0 As the commu-
nications industry experiences profound transforma-
tion, two central implications for this current
communications revolution may be worthy of consid-
eration:28' first, the future growth in communications
lies not in people speaking to people, but rather, in
machines speaking to machines on behalf of their
human owners; and second, within the. next decade
or so, the medium of communications will be less of
a conduit between locations, and more of a destina-
tion in and of itself-a place where professional and
personal interactions occur.232 An appropriate recog-
nition of these basic premises may prove to be criti-
cal in understanding the metamorphosis of the com-
munications marketplace.
C. Articulating The Vision For The User
1. Wireless Technology
With AT&T, MCI and Sprint all demonstrating
an interest in wireless technology, some believe that
their strategic business decisions should increase
competition in the local loop.2"' The fostering of lo-
cal competition may result in lower prices for both
long-haul and local services because wireless commu-
nications may enable long distance carriers to reduce,
if not eliminate, the immense access fees they cur-
rently pay to the local carriers.2 4 It is also hoped
that competition stimulated by the single-vendor ap-
proach being pursued by such companies as AT&T,
Bell Atlantic and MCI will cause a drop in costs and
an improvement in services.215 Users stand to benefit
from the involvement of long-haul carriers in the
wireless market, because IXCs generally are more
sophisticated about data services than are local carri-
228 Id.
,22 Id.
230 Id.
I'l Saffo, supra note 202, at 52.
232 Id. Voice conversations account for less than one-half of
all communications between the U.S. and Japan on AT&T's
long lines, with the majority of all traffic generated by facsimile.
Id.
Id" Moeller, supra note 89, at 14.
'"4 Brown, supra note 100, at 49. MCI estimates that access
charges paid to local exchange carriers currently account for ap-
proximately forty-five cents of every dollar taken in by the com-
pany. Gareiss, supra note 129, at 1.
235 Id. If MCI succeeds in its campaign to loosen regulations
on the types of local services it may provide, the company
predicts that business users in those cities soon to be serviced by
its local network are likely to see a "double-digit" percentage
drop in local access costs by 1996. Id. at 61.
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ers.' 6 This interest by the primary IXCs, however,
does not necessarily translate into innovative techno-
logical gadgets for the telecommunications user, be-
cause historically most big ideas have originated with
small companies that grew into significant market
players, such as MCI and Sprint.
For the most part, however, it appears that man-
agers of corporate networks are quite skeptical about
the wireless networking capabilities of the new
AT&T.2 3 7 To these skeptics, this technology remains
a novelty, characterized by minimal short-term im-
pact 2 8 and uncertain long-term advantages, and few
expect AT&T to benevolently pass any access charge
savings on to the user."3 9 Despite the fact that future
services, such as PCS and mobile technology, prom-
ise to yield benefits to business users, as advocated by
Robert Allen in his "anytime, anyplace" communi-
cations slogan,24° such visionary goals are often quite
difficult for the average user to understand, let alone
articulate.2"'
2. Cable
The recent C&P decision by Judge Ellis, permit-
ting Bell Atlantic to offer cable programming in the
Virginia area where the company provides local
phone service, provides the opportunity to increase
competition in the video programming market and to
curtail the effect of local cable monopolies.242 Be-
cause the majority of local cable subscribers are
served by only one cable company in their service
area, the significance of the C&P decision is that it is
ultimately about more choices for the consumer.243
But is society willing to pay any price for technol-
206 Id.
207 Mulqueen, supra note 1, at 1, 146.
20 For his part, Sprint Chairman William Esrey viewed
MCI's plan in the same positive light as all other local access
plans made by telcos, cable, cellular and PCS companies, but
negated the possibility of any short-term impact. Gareiss, supra
note 129, at 1.
209 Id.
40 Id.
241 David Burger, Everything Converging, But Toward
What End, COMM. WEEK, Aug. 30, 1993, at 1.
242 Skrzycki, supra note 67, at A6.
:43 Id.
44 Samuelson, supra note 57, at A25.
145 Id. One estimate sets the cost at $1000 per household,
making the total cost of wiring all 96 million households in the
United States an outrageous $100 billion. Id. Others place the
cost in the hundreds of millions. Electronic Superhighway Will
Be Costly, TELECOMM. ALERT, Jan. 3, 1994.
246 Id.
247 Id.
ogy? Despite the fact that long-distance companies
have laid over 95,000 miles of fiber optic cables
across the country, an expense of billions, few would
have a problem in justifying the wisdom of such an
expenditure since these long lines already carry huge
volumes of traffic.2" Upgrading residences with fiber
optic cables may be harder to rationalize. While the
upgrade is a necessary step in paving the way for the
information superhighway, it is an incredibly expen-
sive undertaking.245 Virtually all of the cost will be
borne by the private sector, with telcos and cable
companies estimated to spend as much as $50 billion
on the construction of advanced networks nationwide
within the next five years.24 '
In addition, with the average American family
currently spending approximately $55 per month for
phone service and $31 per month for basic cable,
they may not want to pay additional fees for new
innovations such as video-on-demand or interactive
television. 47 If the convergence between cable and
telecommunications companies succeeds, it is likely
that the home television set will become a two-way
conduit for more new programs, products, games and
services than most consumers can imagine or, quite
possibly, even desire.2" And for a society in which
many cannot even program their VCRs, 49 the ease
with which these new technologies must be obtained
and performed, with a minimum of effort and ex-
pense, cannot be underestimated.
Access to 500 channels and a wealth of informa-
tion does not necessarily create an informed or proto-
typical civilization, nor does it mean that the average
viewer will choose to "motor along the information
superhighway."' Because new technologies have a
248 Mannes, supra note 62, at 46.
249 Moeller, supra note 21, at 25.
250 In fact, the research has shown that the American public
neither wants nor cares about access to 500 channels. Don West
& Kim McAvoy, Staking a Claim On the Future; Role of
Broadcast TV. in a Multimedia World, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Apr. 19, 1993, at 20. One such example is GTE's ambi-
tious Main Street project in Cerritos, CA, which offered interac-
tive television services over the past four years. A test that GTE
claimed would "shape future telecommunications for the whole
country" can hardly be described as a success when few residents
of the community have subscribed (only 350 out of Cerritos'
7300 cable subscribers are users) and most do not even get cable
TV. John Lippman, TV of Tomorrow' Is a Flop Today;
GTE"s California Experiment in Two-Way Cable Finds Few
Takers, Many Skeptics, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1993, at Fl.
"Subscribers who have lived with GTE's high tech system report
they would rather rent movies from the video store because it is
cheaper, or sit down at the kitchen table to pay bills instead of
entrusting the task to their televisions." Id. Project head Don
Bache admitted that such projects are based primarily upon
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tendency to create chaos and confusion in the name
of change and to necessarily retard progress by
breeding new economic, legal, technical and societal
problems, the impact of innovative technologies is
not immediately recognizable.251 Such long-term
repercussions indicate that taking the needs of the
user into account is absolutely critical to a successful
communications revolution. Along the way to achiev-
ing technological greatness, the human consumer
must not be forgotten. As experimental products and
services vie for attention, it must be remembered that
users also have a powerful stake in the multimedia
future.1
52
As one journalist eloquently noted, "[t]he
truth-both grim and hopeful-is that technology is
what we make of it and we are what we are. 25
And the truth is, there is no way of knowing in the
present, how successful or desirable this proliferation
of technology will prove to be to the consumer of the
future.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the telecommunications industry undergoes ex-
plosive changes, the significance of the aforemen-
tioned mergers cannot be underestimated. The land-
scape of the entire telecommunications industry
stands to change, and with it, the regulations of the
past. While AT&T continues to be a dominant
force, especially in the wake of its proposed merger
with McCaw, current trends in the marketplace in-
dicate to some observers that perhaps the time has
come for Congress, the governmental agencies and
the court systems to divorce themselves from tradi-
tional regulations designed to protect and foster com-
petition in a monopolized, or at least a heavily domi-
nated telecommunications industry. Likewise,
perhaps it is time to lift completely the ban on cross-
ownership and to permit telcos and cable companies
to unite in order to break the chains of local
monopolies.
It is imperative, however, that the antitrust impli-
cations of such mergers be thoroughly examined. If
such mergers are merely unions bent on pursuit of
vertical integration undermining the public interest,
they themselves are inherently monopolistic and can-
not be permitted to exist simply to destroy previously
existing monopolies. Because the task of antitrust
merger law is premised upon the need to safeguard
the free competition so essential to the preservation
of our democratic, political and social institutions,
the goal must be to approve only those mergers
whose benefits to the public outweigh their probable
adverse consequences. The issue ultimately to be de-
cided is whether the mergers discussed herein are in
the public interest and, if so, whether they should be
permitted to occur at all.
The manner in which the market and the individ-
ual user respond to such mergers will be measured
largely by the success achieved in the development of
promising wireless communications services such as
PCS, the timeliness with which the tangible benefits
of such systems can be passed on to the consuming
public and, ultimately, whether the corporate vision
is truly aligned with the public interest.
This is no longer a POTS-plain old telephone
service-world. Today's common carriers must be
broad-based suppliers of all kinds of services. With-
out an infrastructure capable of supporting current
technology, cable companies may have to unite in or-
der to, compete. The rapid and pervasive abundance
of proposed mergers between telephone, cellular and
wireless communications companies, and major play-
ers within the cable, and film industries is evidence
that the telecommunications industry will be more
expansive within the next five years than heretofore
thought possible.
252 Fleischmann, supra note 22, at TI0.
i Id.; "For good or ill, couch potatoes are going to become
power potatoes." Mannes, supra note 62, at 46.
speculation and said, "I don't know whether we can prove de-
mand exists for all these services." Id.
51 Samuelson, supra note 57, at A25.
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